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Book Review
The Benchwarmers. By Joseph C. Goulden. Weybright & Talley;
1974. Pp. 352. $12.50.
If the dominant theme of a book on the federal judiciary can be said
to appeal to prurient interests, The Benchwarmers is the book. Through
the selection of unrepresentative occurrences, manifestly erroneous interpretations and not a little muckraking, Joseph C. Goulden has painted a
picture of the federal bench that is at best a gross inaccuracy and at worst
a consummate prostitution to the current mania for capitalizing on corruption and incompetence in government. It is, therefore, particularly
unfortunate that this book was written by a well-known journalist and is
probably destined to be read by a large number of people, most of whom
will thereby derive their total knowledge of the subject matter.
No one, this writer included, who has spent much time in and around
federal district courts can honestly say that he has not observed instances
of unacceptable conduct by federal judges. Neither would many such
persons argue that a district judge who is unfit for office - whether because
he gets intoxicated, is overly partial to certain interests, is consistently
disrespectful of counsel or litigants, engages in financial improprieties,
expresses racial or ethnic biases or simply is incapable of doing his job
should escape the loudest and most vehement condemnations nor fail to
feel the full weight of the constitutional mechanisms available for his removal. Federal courts are public institutions of government and are fair
game for any and all criticism. I do not fault Goulden for his attacks on
certain judges, albeit that quite a few seem undeserved. I do fault him
for purporting to write a book that is "concerned with the personalities
and the politics of the federal trial bench" (p. 17) when, in fact, he has
written no more than a collection of gossip and half-truths.
The book begins with an explanation of the procedures attending
federal judicial appointments. Goulden points out, quite correctly, that the
screening agency in that process, the American Bar Association's Standing
Committee on the Judiciary, is not a broadly representative group; it is
composed primarily, if not exclusively, of attorneys who are members of
powerful and usually large law firms that serve big corporate clients; it
tends to approve its own kind (pp. 41-43). But the pregnant conclusion,
suggested by incidents described throughout the book, is erroneous: federal
district judges do not on the whole show a strong bias in favor of gross
economic interests.1 Surprisingly, one often finds a judge who, although
1. That this is so does not, of course, vindicate the stilted selection process.
The conspicuous absence, for example, of members of minority groups in federal
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pressed from the elitist mold depicted by Goulden, is totally hospitable to
a party seeking to advance the cause of environmental protection or to
correct the balance between corporate power and the needs of an impecunious individual. The Benchwarmers tells us very little about such
instances and even less about the relative freedom from economic coercion
that the federal courts, as compared with other branches of government,
enjoy.
The main body of this book is divided into four chapters, two each
dealing with the system when it works and when it does not work. It is
immediately clear that the author's selection from among the nearly one
hundred federal district courts is not a fair sampling. The district courts
chosen all sit in major cities - New York, Chicago, Washington and
Oklahoma City2 - and three of these courts are among the busiest in the
United States. One, the United States District Court for the Northern
District of Illinois, has a track record for incompetence that is unequalled.
Two of the other courts chosen also have unique characteristics: the United
States District Court for the Southern District of New York is uncommonly top-heavy in big money litigation, and the United States District
Court for the District of Columbia is peculiarly involved in litigation affecting the conduct of the federal government. By selecting these district
courts and by choosing cases in them that can best be described as cause
c~l~bres, Goulden creates the erroneous impression that the main business
of federal courts is politics, an impression that he uses to bolster his thesis
that federal judges should be less aloof from external pressures (see, e.g.
pp. 2-3, 11,209, 352).
The author's examples of the system when it works reveal little appreciation for the limited role of the federal courts in our system of government. The two major examples of a properly functioning district court
are the IBM Antitrust Case3 and the Watergate Case,4 both of which,
while redounding to the everlasting credit of the judges who sat in them,
are examples of an article three tribunal operating near its breaking point.
Cases such as IBM and Watergate - like the Apportionment Casesr evolve only because the other, primarily responsible, branches of governjudicial office is injurious to basic notions of equality and to the appearance of justice
even if the presence of such persons would make no substantial difference in the
decisions of particular courts.
2. The courts chosen are the United States District Courts for the Southern
District of New York, the Northern District of Illinois, the District of Columbia
and the Western District of Oklahoma.
3. United States v. International Business Machines Corp., Civil No. 69-200
(S.D.N.Y., filed Jan. 17, 1969).
4. United States v. Liddy, Crim. No. 1827-72 (D.D.C., judgment and commitment filed Jan. 30, 1973).
5. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964); Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368
(1963) ; Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
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ment have failed.8 This is not to say that federal courts should not act
when the need arises from the failure of the other branches. But federal
courts, in fact all courts, are not ideal forums for the resolution of economic or political problems that are deeply embedded in the fabric of
American society. The justification for federal courts does not rest, therefore, upon a handful of last-gasp judicial intercessions, but upon the hundreds, perhaps thousands, of cases in which important national policies are
vindicated in narrowly-defined controversies concerning parties before the
court.

7

Nowhere in The Benchwarmers does the author demonstrate an
appreciation of the essential differences that characterize the judicial branch
of government. It is perhaps unfair to expect a non-lawyer to understand
abstruse doctrines such as standing, ripeness, mootness or justiciability
and when three is a "case or controversy" or a "political question." But
anyone claiming familiarity with the federal judiciary should be conscious,
for example, of the fact that the courts do not choose their business. Even
the casual observer should be able to recognize that the federal courts have
neither the means to investigate beyond the attorneys' presentations nor
the ability to formulate policies other than those necessary to the resolution
of the disputes brought before them. The parade of horrors contained in
this book is, therefore, an inchoate depiction of the federal courts: Goulden
fails to acknowledge that their potential for doing harm is far less than
that of the other branches of government s and the availability of meaningful corrective mechanisms is far greater. 9
Since the central theme of this book is the extent to which federal
judges lead cloistered existences, and since every conceivable form of unseemly behavior is cited to support the proposition that this is essentially
undesirable, it would seem that some indication of the judicial and extrajudicial conduct relevant to a judge's competence would be in order. The
Benchwarmers, however, does not suggest even the blurriest of lines for
determining the relevancy of particular conduct. It treats, for example, a
district judge's somewhat childish affinity for a hood ornament and custom
license plate on his car (pp. 206-07) with the same perturbation as another
district judge's engagement in real estate speculations involving a company
6. See H.

HART & A. SACHS, THE LEGAL PROCESS

384--85, 398, 400 (tent.

ed. 1958).
7. Had he chosen to do so, Goulden might have discussed the contributions of
such judges as Frank M. Johnson, Jr., of the United States District Court for the
Middle District of Alabama (a total of seven lines, pp. 3, 316) and James E. Doyle
of the United States District Court for the Western District of Wisconsin (never
mentioned), whose continuous insistence upon the rule of law in the most trying of
cases has commended them to countless serious students of the federal courts.
8. See A. BIcKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH (1962).
9. For

example, Goulden skims over

(p.

137)

the

Seventh Circuit's

strong

condemnation of the district court's mishandling of the Chicago Seven Trial. In re
Dellinger, 461 F.2d 389 (7th Cir. 1972).

1975]

BOOK REVIEW

that ultimately came under investigation (p. 125). The book also fails to
indicate the extent to which a judge's private conduct should or should not
be subject to constraints as demanding as those upon his official conduct.
By these omissions Goulden plainly reveals that his true purpose is not to
say something definitive about the negative side of unaccountability of the
federal judiciary.
Late in the book Goulden moves discursively from federal district
courts to the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia. 10
Here, as throughout the book, Goulden persists in inferring that there is
somehow a corrupt nexus between the undercurrent of personal idiosyncrasies, relationships, and frailties he ferrets out and the decisions
reached in particular cases. If he were simply saying that federal judges,
like everyone else, are strongly affected by their individual values and
experiences, I would have no quarrel with him. He is, however, saying,
or strongly intimating, much more than that. Goulden's treatment of the
evolution of the test for criminal insanity in the District of Columbia
exemplifies his tendency to question the credibility of the federal judiciary
by distorting specific events.
Most lawyers and many non-lawyers are aware that, in recent years,
the law concerning when a mental illness will exculpate a defendant from
criminal responsibility has been in a state of flux. In the District of
Columbia Circuit, the law progressed from the M'Naghten "right-wrong"
rule" to the Durham "product" rule 12 to the American Law Institute twopronged standard of responsibility.' 3 An important moving force behind
those changes was Chief Judge David L. Bazelon, whose exposure to and
knowledge of psychiatry is considerable. Goulden deals with this evolution
and with Judge Bazelon's role in terms that, while not wholly false, utterly
demean a serious and competent jurist's admittedly groping efforts to
reconcile the criminal law's operative definition of insanity with the evolving consensus among respected psychiatrists and psychologists that volitional as well as cognitive limitations may curtail a person's freedom of
choice to act in a particular manner. To say that "the Durham case turned
out to be a mouthful of ashes" (p. 261) because the test proved difficult to
apply and because it was ultimately discarded is like saying that the Dred
Scott case stands for nothing because slavery has been abolished.
Goulden also briefly touches upon the thorny problems of disparate
sentences for white collar crimes (pp. 104-05), of seemingly unequal sentences for the same crime (pp. 105-06) and of variations in result due
to the fortuity of the judges chosen for an appellate panel (p. 265). Again,
10. The author insists on calling this court the "D.C. Court of Appeals" or the
"D.C. Appeals Court."
11. United States v. Guiteau, 12 D.C. (1 Mackey) 498 (1882); see Smith v.
United States, 36 F.2d 548 (D.C. Cir. 1929).
12. Durham v. United States, 214 F.2d 862 (D.C. Cir. 1954).
13. United States v. Brawner, 471 F.2d 969 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
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he seems to be suggesting that these sometimes undesirable conditions are
manifestations of evil motives on the part of the judges. Goulden neglects
to consider another equally plausible explanation for these problems: the
system, which necessarily entails a large degree of discretion, fails to accommodate the differing but honestly held views of the decision-makers.
This does not mean that these problems do not warrant (and are not
receiving) serious consideration; to be useful, however, such consideration
will have to come from those with a less jaundiced and more comprehending
eye than Goulden's.
Although the author ultimately concedes the importance of the principle of judicial independence (pp. 349-52), and although he never seriously
suggests a practicable alternative to the available avenues for dealing with
an incompetent judge,14 Goulden is constantly critical of the unanswerability of the federal judiciary. While his final words hold otherwise (p.
551), The Benchwarmers comes across as a failure to understand that
the very notion of independence - whether it is embodied in a constitutional
guarantee of tenure in office or an immunity from suit - means that some
improper actions will go unredressed (see, e.g., pp. 141, 232-33). If we
could be assured of judges who are right one hundred percent of the time
and who are certain that they will be judged as right, we would not need
to guarantee all federal judges impunity for their official actions. Failing
this, the principle of judicial independence must be appraised, not only in
light of the protection afforded the worst action ever taken by a judge, but
also in light of the countless times a federal judge might have been unable
to act but for the principle. The types of situations depicted by Goulden
are precisely the ones in which the parameters of the principle of judicial
independence are settled for all cases.
Goulden has wrested from the mass of available evidence concerning
the functioning of the federal judiciary that which is most unsavory and
atypical. He has ignored or slighted the indispensable, and largely fulfilled,
role of these tribunals in our constitutional scheme. And he has presented
the product of these distortions in precisely that form which portends large
sales. Coming, as it does, at a time when the resilience of all our governing
institutions is seriously in question, The Benchwarmers is a most unfortunate literary event.
James M. Kramon*
14. The existing procedures are impeachment, U.S. CONST. art. II, § 4 and art.
III, § 1, and, in certain circumstances, a petition for the appointment of an additional
judge to the particular court, 28 U.S.C. § 372(b) (1970).
* Assistant United States Attorney for the District of Maryland. B.S., Carnegie-Mellon University, 1966; J.D., George Washington University, 1969; LL.M.,
Harvard Law School, 1970. The views expressed herein are strictly those of the author.

